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MACINTYRE AND THE LIMITS OF 
KIERKEGAARDIAN RATIONALITY 
Bruce W. Ballard 
Recently in this journal Marilyn Gaye Piety argued both that the critique of 
Kierkegaardian choice Alasdair MacIntyre offers in After Virtue misconstrues 
Kierkegaard and that a reformulated version of Kierkegaardian choice offers 
an important gain for philosophy. I argue that Piety has underestimated the 
power of the Maclntyrean critique of Kierkegaard, that consequently an ade-
quate account of rational choice remains unavailable from that quarter, and 
that at crucial points MacIntyre's own socially teleological approach to 
choice offers a superior account. 
In a recent article in this journal, 1 Marilyn Gaye Piety argues that in After 
Virtue Alasdair MacIntyre has misunderstood the nature of Kierkegaard's case 
for a movement from an aesthetic to an ethical form of life and hence mis-
labeled Kierkegaard as an irrationalist? Piety goes on to outline a 
Kierkegaardian model of impassioned rational choice in order to avoid the 
current false dichotomy between choiceless rational evolution and plainly 
irrational choice between theoretical frameworks. She further develops and 
illustrates the model using Kierkegaard's transition from the ethical to the 
religious stage of existence. I will argue that Piety has underestimated the 
force of the MacIntyrean critique of Kierkegaardian choice and consequently 
overestimated the possibility for a coherent Kierkegaardian rationality. These 
points are amplified by considering Kierkegaardian rationality against com-
paratively stronger aspects of the account of rational choice MacIntyre pro-
poses. 
There is certainly enough prima facie evidence in Kierkegaard's own de-
scription of choice, particularly in Either/Or? to warrant the claim that 
Kierkegaard is an irrationalist. On the other hand, Either/Or is full of argu-
ments against the aesthetic form and in favor of the ethical. How can this be? 
Following Polanyi, Piety'S answer for Kierkegaard generally is that tension 
within one's own view cannot be overcome until and unless the situation 
appears to violate a personal judgment of what is probable.4 Passion makes 
this movement possible. In fact, the more passionate one is, the less incon-
sistency is necessary for abandoning the view in question.5 
Both Piety and Kierkegaard admit that there is such a thing as too much 
passion or 'subjective madness.'6 The problem is that the proper degree of 
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passion cannot be specified.7 But if it is only an unspecifiably 'high' degree 
(high relative to what socially constituted norm?) of personal passion which 
determines when a view has crossed the line into unacceptable improbability, 
what makes the choice rational? Here, I take it, Macintyre's emphasis on 
rational teleology has some force. 8 If my will is to be rationally guided I need 
a theoretical grasp of my ultimate end. Without this grasp, or with an end 
about which I have become confused and doubtful, how shall I deliberate 
about what is best for me to do? If I have undisciplined passions, perhaps not 
having subordinated myself to the requirements of the practices9 which make 
up a recognizable tradition of enquiry, won't my judgment be idiosyncratic? 
One could argue, as Kierkegaard does, that passions have their own dia-
lectics. IO Yet for Piety, even if actual subjective experience can provide 
criteria for choosing between frameworks for interpreting existence, it will 
not necessarily incline one toward a particular interpretation of existenceY 
But if passionate subjectivity cannot even supply determinate negation in its 
rejection of a life view, it has lost what remained of the Hegelian rationality 
Kierkegaard inherits. 
But Kierkegaard does retain a form of Hegelian dialectical rationality. 
Though he tries to make the movement between stages dependent upon pas-
sionate choice, the whole scheme of the development of the concept of the 
aesthetic in Either/Or is obviously Hegelian. Kierkegaard is clearly trying to 
exhibit contradiction internal to the aesthetic point of view and to show how 
the ethical view resolves such contradiction while at the same time preserving 
the best insights of the original position. MacIntyre identified the tension 
between the two approaches to choice here more explicitly before the critique 
in After Virtue: "The difficulty is that Kierkegaard wished both to maintain 
that there could be no objective criterion for the decision between the two 
alternatives, and to show that the ethical was superior to the aesthetic.,,12 By 
trying to show that the aesthetic view fails by its own criteria, Kierkegaard 
offers an objective refutation which, due to the common debt to Hegel, meets 
many of the requirements of Maclntyrean rationality.I3 By leaving the deci-
sion to passionate choice, Kierkegaard seems to disregard such demonstra-
tion. Kierkegaard's both/and here is really an either/or. 
What are we to make of this apparently blank inconsistency? Macintyre's 
typical strategy at such a juncture is to examine relevant historical antece-
dents together with the sociology implicit in the moral view in question. Such 
a move is not possible for Kierkegaard who, while a master of psychological 
observation and description, has almost no sociology and only individual 
history. Kierkegaard is heir to a number of traditions of varying kinds and 
degrees of incompatibility. MacIntyre identifies a number of the key sources 
here: the centrality of passion in the doctrine of choice comes from roman-
ticism, the concept of the ethical from Kant, the concept of reason from Pascal 
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and the larger protestant tradition, some of the content of his ethics from 
Lutheranism, and the dialectic from Hegel. I4 In addition to these debts, 
Kierkegaard also explicitly makes use of Hegel's concept of alienation 
against the aesthete, who will be unhappy to the degree to which he has his 
essence outside himself. I5 
We have seen that Hegelian dialectic and the romanticism of feeling do not 
combine for a coherent theory of choice. But there is also incoherence in 
making the choice for the ethical a purely subjective and passionate one while 
the concept of ethics is abstract and universal. In Kant the ethical imperative 
is abstract and universal because its source is reason, from which it also 
derives its authority. Our choice for the ethical is based on the subjective 
feeling of respect, but this feeling is self-wrought by reason. Any empirically 
interested passion is unfree and at best morally irrelevant. Kant's examples 
of morally esteemable acts in the Foundations are notorious for their lack of 
passion: the best identified moral act is that in which there is no passion. As 
MacIntyre notes, Kierkegaard's ethical stage has no authority but the passion of 
the individual choosing it. I6 Indeed, Kierkegaard's spokesman for the ethical, 
Judge William of Either/Or, claims only the authority of experience. 17 
That and how further incompatibilities could be developed is probably 
evident from the list of sources given above. A more central issue for the 
question concerning rationally choosing the ethical is the content of 
Kierkegaard's ethical. As MacIntyre points out, it is a conservative and tra-
ditional ethics, dealing with promise-keeping, truth-telling, and benevolence 
"understood in a very simple way.,,18 But Kierkegaard's development of the 
ethical view is 'traditional' in a number of other ways which MacIntyre does 
not examine but are nevertheless both available to his approach and important 
for what they say against the rationality of passionate choice for the ethical. 
As noted earlier, Kierkegaard's analysis of experience is psychological; it 
is centered on the subjective experience of the individual as individual. The 
danger of such exclusive attention is manifest: a partial and distorted view 
of reality for the lack of attention to the larger social and historical dimen-
sions of the human situation. This is nowhere clearer than in Kierkegaard's 
ethical picture. 
In a word, Kierkegaard's paradigm of the ethical stage is the life of a 
self-satisfied bourgeois. Following Hegel rather than Kant, Kierkegaard takes 
ethical life to include the satisfaction of work and domestic life. Unlike Hegel 
and the Aristotelian tradition he in part represents, Kierkegaard's ethical is 
virtually apolitical. On one hand, Kierkegaard acknowledges that Aristotle 
has an advantage over Kant in connecting justice to the social sense and 
friendship. 19 On the other hand, since this led Aristotle to make the state the 
highest concept, Kierkegaard rejects the Aristotelian approach.20 But without 
something like the synthesis Aquinas effects between Aristotelian notions of 
social membership and purpose together with the ultimate end of Christianity, 
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Kierkegaard ends up with an abortive teleology.21 When he claims that per-
sonality is its own teleology, it is not a socially and historically situated 
personality to which he refers. This is very clear in his remarks about mar-
riage, work, and in general in the lack of any clear notion or concern for 
justice in the ethical stage of life! 
Kierkegaard reproaches the aesthete for his heartless insistence to the non-
rich that without a lot of money one cannot enjoy life?2 This is consistent 
with Kierkegaard's application of the Hegelian concept of alienation to the 
aesthete: he has his essential conditions of existence, here money, outside 
himself. Kierkegaard anticipates the argument that without certain external 
conditions, for example a living wage, even marriage becomes an impossible 
situation for the non-rich. His reply together with his larger ethic of work 
cannot help but remind that Kierkegaard was unmarried and, much more, that 
he did not have to support himself by working. 
Kierkegaard's reply is that if someone tries, he (Kierkegaard means the 
male) will be able to find work at a living wage sufficient for his family's 
need, regardless of market or employment conditions. Kierkegaard concurs 
with Luther that it was never heard that a Christian man should die of hun-
ger.23 Such a contextless appeal to providence suggests that the ethical stage 
cannot be justified apart from Christian theology and that with the ellipsis in 
Kierkegaard's analysis of the social conditions of work he cannot justify his 
work ethic. He later adds what he takes to be empirical support for his 
doctrine of work, but reminds that strictly speaking empirical support is 
irrelevant when it comes to ethics?4 
More generally, to see work as ethically meaningful, Kierkegaard would 
have us see every job as a calling?S But this calling retains the vagueness even 
now associated with the concept since it is unrelated to the social structure of 
work. Kierkegaard acknowledges that people want their work to bt; meaningful 
in the sense that they accomplish something socially necessary or useful. But 
since determining the extent of one's own contribution to society in one's work 
is so impracticable, accomplishment "is identical with doing one's job.,,26 
For Kierkegaard, to reckon the meaning of an individual work life in this way 
is in keeping with and reflects the rational order of things?7 
This amounts to treating the particular socio-economic order of 19th cen-
tury Denmark as timelessly natural. With his ateleological and abstract uni-
versal-human duty to work, Kierkegaard ends up making a virtue of alienated 
labor. Again his lack of reflection on social structures cuts him off from either 
the modern concept of alienated labor or a just wage, just price formulation 
such as Aquinas develops out of his systematically Christian integration of 
Aristotle's analysis of the social. Again this cannot come as a surprise since 
unlike Aquinas, with his concept of a justice which is in part graspable by 
natural reason, Kierkegaard simply does not consider a system of what is due 
between social members. 
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How is all of this relevant to the rationality of the choice for ·the ethical? 
The point is that even if the Hegelian arguments Kierkegaard uses to reject 
aestheticism were successful, such a success does not leave the ethical con-
ception or content Kierkegaard outlines in Either/Or as the clear rational 
alternative. The antidote to aestheticism Kierkegaard offers, namely hard 
work regardless of pay, a vaguely church-going religion and the domestic 
idyll (idol?), exerted and continues to exert some attractive force. But with 
the decline of Christianity as a social ethos in the West, the concept of marital 
duty naturally declines. With a greater consciousness of the social structure 
of work has come wider pain at its injustice in both the developed and 
so-called developing worlds. 
That Kierkegaard himself rejects the concept of religion alluded to in 
Either/Or for the more intense and paradoxical concept most apparent in Fear 
and Trembling suggests that he also recognized the fragility of his ethical 
stage together with its unsystematic connection to religion. That the final 
stage of religious existence is and should be seen as completely without social 
context, even without a church body, is perfectly in keeping with its absolute 
unintelligibility to ethical consciousness as natural reason grasping natural 
justice. But let us consider the rationality of the choice for paradoxical Chris-
tianity over the standpoint of universal ethics. 
Piety wants to show that this move is rational and that it could be defended 
against MacIntyre's criticisms of the irrationality of the movement from aestheti-
cism to ethical existence. Impassioned rationality rightly chooses Christianity 
out of its consciousness of sin and the ultimate passionate intensity this con-
sciousness engenders in the individual considering whether he or she may be 
blessed or damned.28 But this revised form of Pascal's wager suffers the same 
drawbacks of that construction. In fact, MacIntyre addresses the rationality 
of Kierkegaard's choice for the religious stage ~uite specifically before After 
Virtue, and again in the pages of this journal.2 The problem of choice both 
Kierkegaard and Pascal share is why Christianity must be adopted over some 
other religion such as Islam?O MacIntyre also points out here that just as any 
super-individual authority is lacking in the ethical stage, so is the notion of 
the objective truth of Christianity lost at the religious stage?l 
It could be added here that the picture of religious life drawn at the para-
doxical religious stage importantly varies from the very congregational struc-
ture of New Testament Christianity and completely neglects the challenges 
and opportunities which came later with the expression of Christianity in 
wider social and political culture. Especially in Fear and Trembling this life 
sounds like total isolation in constant inward suffering and trial. 
Kierkegaard emphasizes that humanly speaking the choice for the paradoxi-
cal religious stage is absurd. No one can tell the knight of faith whether he 
or she is in a trial of faith or a temptation to madness. Consequently there 
can be no help between people of faith and no essential need of a body of 
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believers or church. With Kierkegaard's emphasis on the humanly irrational 
nature of both the choice for this kind of existence and its continuance 
together with Piety's admission that Kierkegaardian passionate choice need 
not lead in a particular direction, what is left of rationality? 
On the other hand, consider the socially teleological conception of rational 
choice for Christianity MacIntyre provides in "Which God ought we to obey 
and why?" On this account, Kierkegaard's religious stage and its absurd 
choice reflect the Blakean concept of God as Nobodaddy, whose command 
makes right (however teleologically suspended) apart from and even against 
any human conception of right. 32 While the argument is directed primarily 
toward Barth and Ramm, the description of what it would mean for Abraham 
to express faith from an integrated reason and feeling 33 stands in clear con-
trast to Kierkegaard's depiction. 
By outlining an historical progression in which the concepts of justice, 
goodness and divinity are mutually implicated, MacIntyre preserves the in-
tegrity of natural reason grasping natural justice through actual social and 
historical particularity and relativity. At the same time, natural reason and its 
grasp of natural justice are understood as the work of God so that human 
judgment is corrected and supplemented (by revelation) but not destroyed.34 
Without simply repeating MacIntyre's argument, it may suffice .to point out 
that this project allows for genuinely human rational choice both for and in 
religious life in a way which Kierkegaard's conception rules out in principle. 
Although with Kierkegaard we are often movingly directed toward loving 
God with our whole heart and strength, we are not so directed in loving Him 
with our mind. 
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